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The Good and the Best: Being realistic about social change1 
 
Abstract: 
Too often calls for utopian social change serve as a device for conserving the status quo, because they 
pose objectives that are beyond what is feasible to implement and devalue reachable marginal 
improvement. As Voltaire famously remarked: ‘the best is the enemy of the good’. In this paper I 
suggest that being realistic about social change means seriously committing to realize it. I argue that 
social change should be conceived and evaluated in terms of a course of action rather than merely an 
ideal end-state. End-states must be assessed in conjunction with the means they require, other 
consequences they imply, and their likelihood of success (i.e. as a course of action). These additional 
three elements give rise to three distinct failures of being realistic about social change: the fanatic 
who does not consider the cost of means, the saint who does not consider the benefit of end-states, 
and the naïve who does not consider likelihood of success. Similar failures can be construed as 
empirical mistakes in giving the course of action due consideration: the ineffective actor (who fails 
to acquire available knowledge of means), the wishful thinker (whose knowledge of consequences is 
distorted by preferences) and the self-deceiver (whose knowledge of end-states is distorted by his 
preferences). Being realistic about social change – I conclude - does not mean that we should not be 
ambitious in what we propose, but that we should avoid these six fallacies if we truly care about 
realizing it. 
Keywords: Social Change; Political Realism; Action; Fanaticism; Deontology; Wishful Thinking; 
Self-Deception 
 
 
 
Carlo Burelli, Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici, Università del Piemonte Orientale 
carlo.burelli@uniupo.it 
                                                     
1 Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the University of Manchester (MANCEPT 2016), at the University of Milan (Political 
Philosophy Seminar) and at the University of Pavia (Mercoledì Filosofici del Maino). I thank all participants for their insightful 
comments and helpful discussion. 
Carlo Burelli 
2 
 
“Were it not sinful then, striving to mend, 
To mar the subject that before was well?” 
Shakespeare, Sonnet 103 
 
Introduction 
An old Italian proverb, referenced by Voltaire in ‘La Bégueule’, states that ‘the best is the enemy of 
the good’ (Voltaire 1877: 50). The idea is that perfection is difficult to reach, and by striving for it 
we may overlook small incremental improvements which are feasible right away. Indeed, in some 
cases, calls for wildly utopian social changes, may compromise other feasible improvements, and 
ironically end up preserving the status quo. 
This intuition, I take it, is at the core of the quite common idea that being realist is a good thing in the 
political world, although many may contest what such realism actually requires.  
A recent literature has developed about what it means to do realist political theory: designing a 
normative theory, which avoids being as ‘moralistic’ (Williams 2005: 5) as much of the philosophical 
tradition inspired by John Rawls (Rawls 1971; Nozick 1974; Cohen 2008). Moralism is the idea that 
proper political philosophy is a sort of ‘applied ethics’ (Geuss 2008: 6): you start from a general 
theory of what people owe to each other, and then you deductively apply it to political problems. This 
moralism is criticised by realists on a methodological level and on a substantive level. 
On a methodological level, the moralistic attitude is deemed unsatisfactory for two reasons (Horton 
2010). First, it conceives politics in a way that it is very distant from our commonsensical 
understanding of it: roughly as the realm where we politely exchange public reasons about what 
justice demands. As a consequence, important features of actual political life occupy only a marginal 
role (e.g. parties, electoral systems, power asymmetries…). Secondly, moralism applies moral 
standards devised under idealized assumptions to political contexts (Sangiovanni 2016), which are 
collective and involve the exercise of coercive political power (Sangiovanni 2008). As such, its 
normative recommendations fail to offer relevant guidance in the strategic interactions of the real 
world (Schmidtz 2016). 
Moralism is also found deficient on a substantive level because of its focus on demanding moral 
ideals like justice, fairness, freedom and equality. This takes for granted other essential political goods 
like peace (Gray 2002; Wendt 2013), and legitimacy (Rossi 2012; Sleat 2013). 
However, in this paper I assume a different perspective: I inquire what it means for an actor to act in 
a realist way in politics. This position might very well be called common-sense realism, because it 
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closely resembles our intuition about the way the concept is used to criticise political agents. I am not 
asking how should good political institutions be realistically arranged2. I am rather asking how should 
good political actors realistically behave. This approach relates closely to the concerns of classic 
realists. The key point of Machiavelli’s realism is to present itself as a better guide to political actors 
than idealistic ‘specula principis’, which were catalogues of virtues and vices meant to educate 
princes. Machiavelli mostly focused on political action, and never explicitly assumed an institutional 
perspective. He never theorizes about the best form of government, for example, to the point that it 
is still debated the question of whether he favoured a republican govern, as it seems from his 
‘Discourses’ or the prince, as it appears from the homonymous book (Baron 1961). Machiavelli was 
rather more interested in the individual perspective: his claim is that the political actors should not be 
bound by the laws of Christian morality, common at his time (Berlin 1972). In this guise, I want to 
inquire what it might mean today for political actors to be realist. 
In this, I aim to counter a common misconception, that realism is necessarily status quo biased. On 
the contrary, realism is the most effective way to pursue social change. This approach has more to do 
with the way in which one act politically, rather than the ends one pursues. The goal itself may be 
ambitious, and even demand radical reforms (Rossi 2015), but one ought to pursue it in a realistic 
way. 
The Importance of Realizing Preferences 
In a basic sense, a realist is someone who is strongly committed to realize his own preferences. This 
assumption captures the ‘seriousness’ towards one’s own desires towards which many realists are 
sensitive. This concern, for example, is beautifully captured by Max Weber, in his ‘Politics as a 
Vocation’:  
‘For mere passion, however sincerely felt, is not enough in itself. It cannot make a 
politician of anyone, unless service to a "cause" also means that a sense of responsibility 
toward that cause is made the decisive guiding light of action’ (Weber 2004: 77).  
For a political realist, there is no value in holding the right ideal, if one fails at trying to make the 
world resemble it. If we truly value equality, for example, we should be acting in a way that aims to 
increase equality. The thought is that valuing equality means acting in a way that makes our world 
approximate it.  
This view starkly contrasts with political philosophers of idealistic orientation, who believe, for 
instance, that ‘the question for political philosophy is not what to do but what to think, even when 
                                                     
2 I try to do this elsewhere, e.g. (Burelli 2016, 2017) 
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what we should think makes no practical difference’ (Cohen 2008: 268). Under this reading valuing 
equality means believing equality is the right way to think about social relationships, even though one 
does nothing to make the actual world more equal in practice. On the contrary, realists start from a 
very practical concern, and try to characterize how a political actor should behave, not what they 
should believe. This point, cannot unfortunately be persuasively argued here, but it is widely present 
in the realist literature. Following this tradition, this paper will instead inquire how we should 
realistically pursue social change, not which idealized social state is better. 
In this paper, I interpret this realist assumption - the practical orientation to realize one own’s 
preferences - as a ‘meta-preference’ that political actors are presumed to have. If you desire walking 
in the park you must also be willing to sometime take a walk in said park. This is not a particularly 
extraordinary claim. In isolation from other confounding variables, a preference for something must 
imply an inclination to do it. Of course, eventual costs could directly affect the choice of whether to 
actually do it, even though I maintain an inclination for it. If the park institutes an expensive entry 
fee, I might not be willing to walk there anymore, even if I would still enjoy it if it were free. Clearly, 
if the realization of one’s goal counts against some other goal that outweighs the first, it is reasonable 
to wish it not realized.  
One might argue that this meta-preference is already part of the concept of preference itself. Some 
philosophers do believe that ‘it is tautologous that we have reasons to do what serves our ends’ 
(Schmidtz 2014). However, the concept of meta-preference has more controversial implications: in 
conjunction with an external reality that limits our freedom to satisfy our preferences, it can be used 
to filter out those preferences we should not seek to realize. If some preference cannot be realized, 
then our meta-preference puts forward a ‘second order’ (Frankfurt 1988: 21) claim to abandon our 
first order preferences or to reformulate them in realizable terms. This is sometime called ‘strong 
evaluation’ (Taylor 1977), i.e. the idea that qualitative differences among desires commonly interfere 
with a simple and straightforward weighing of preferences.  
Suppose I want everybody to earn more than the average. Given the mathematical definition of 
‘average’, this peculiar preference is impossible to be realized. Thus, the meta-preference would, 
under this interpretation, give me a decisive reason to abandon it. If a social state where everybody 
earns more than the average cannot logically be realized, it obviously contrasts with the meta-
preference and cannot be valuable in a practical realist perspective. Other examples that involve 
weaker kinds of impossibilities might be more controversial.  
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An interesting case is Aesop’s famous fable: ‘The Fox and the Grapes’ (Aesop 1998). Does the 
impossibility of reaching the grapes count as a reason for the fox to abandon her preference (Elster 
1985)? If there is no physical way for the fox to get the grapes, the intuition behind the previous 
mathematical example should carry the same force here. Of course, this case is more problematic 
from an epistemic point of view, as there is no way in practice to know that the grapes are beyond 
reach with the same mathematical certainty of the previous example. It might be the case that the fox 
is discounting some concealed means to do it and, if she suspects this, she might have reasons not to 
discard her preference so easily and keep trying to reach the grapes. Yet suppose by assumption that 
getting the grapes is not just difficult but truly physically impossible for the fox, it would follow that 
she should yield to her meta-preference and abandon her preference for the grapes.  
While reality tells me which means are available, the meta-preference tells me that I ought not to 
pursue goals for which no means are available. This is not universally recognized, as even among 
political realists some believe that realism can be utopian (Geuss 2016) and that it can legitimately 
‘demand the impossible’ (Rossi 2015). While this paper won’t vindicate such a strong conclusion, it 
will defend the claim that realism is indeed the best way to pursue radical social change. 
Deliberating about Courses of Actions 
If we care about realizing our preferences, we should not think of our preferences as ideal end-states 
disconnected from the actions available in the current context. Rather we should deliberate about 
courses of action: 
Course of action = end-state*P + means + consequences 
As the formula states, the desired end-state makes up for only part of the value of a course of action. 
There are three other elements to consider: its likelihood of success, the means involved, and its likely 
consequences. Whenever we merely ponder the desired final state of affairs, we do not act realistically 
and risk failure in realizing our goals. 
Imagine I am considering whether to become a professor of philosophy or an astronaut. Comparing 
end-states (being a professor vs. being an astronaut) is only part of the story, as their practical value 
cannot be properly assessed, if I do not factor in also the likelihood of success, the means involved 
and its likely consequences.  I might in isolation consider being an astronaut much more satisfying 
and enjoyable than being a professor. However, when I need to decide how to act, other considerations 
immediately become relevant.  
First, I need to consider which means are available to become an astronaut. Floating in space may 
sound enticing but knowledge of astrophysics is required to become an astronaut. If I really hate math, 
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becoming an astronaut involves costly means. Such means can impose a significant burden on the 
value of the whole course of action, to the point that it becomes open to question if the costs are 
outweighed by the goal. With respect of social change, if some desired reform requires drastic 
violence to be implemented, we should at least consider whether it is worth doing. This consideration 
echoes the famous saying: ‘you can't make an omelette without breaking eggs’. 
Second: likelihood of success. The most effective means available are still not guaranteed to land a 
success. Thus, selecting a course of action involves discounting the value of the end-state by the 
probability of reaching it. Becoming an astronaut might be more difficult than becoming a professor, 
and thus choosing a course of action must reflect what is technically called an expected utilities: the 
value of the goal, discounted by the probability of getting it. Moreover, it might be hard to backtrack 
on a course of action. If I happen to already have a PhD in philosophy, it would be much costlier for 
me to become an astronaut than it would be if I were fresh out of high school. This is an important 
consideration when pursuing social change, because choosing the less likely option often involves 
the risk of realizing neither. However, this does not mean that ambitious improvements are never 
worth striving for, just that we should balance their desirability against their likelihood. 
Finally, pursuing a course of action might also lead to other foreseeable consequences, which can add 
or subtract to its value. For example, a likely consequence of being an astronaut might be spending a 
lot of time away from one’s family. Another possibly more discomforting consequence is that of 
dying in a space accident. Even if the chance of a lethal accident is not particularly severe, living on 
a space station would still be more dangerous than going to most classrooms. Consequences need not 
only be negative. Suppose that I really like the fame that being an astronaut brings about: this would 
obviously raise the value of the course of action. 
I think the reader can easily discern for himself how the frivolous example of the astronaut can be 
substituted with more serious and controversial questions taken from the political domain. Was 
Lincoln wrong in buying other politician’s votes to get slavery abolished? Was the Italian government 
wrong in refusing to negotiate with terrorists and letting its kidnapped Prime Minister’s Aldo Moro 
be murdered? Was Andreotti wrong in commissioning bloody false-flag terrorist attacks against his 
country, to alienate popular support from a party that planned to turn it into a dictatorship? Was 
Robespierre wrong in liberally using the guillotine to preserve the republic from monarchical 
restoration? Was Cesare Borgia wrong in terrorizing the people of Romagna, to prevent political 
decay and civil war? All these dramatic questions, I claim, have no clear-cut answers, but depend 
highly on the context. For a realist, the means are not always justified by ends, consequences do not 
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always justify means, and principles do not categorically exclude the use of means. Each element 
needs to be contextually balanced against each other.  
This interpretation explains the realist intuition that political judgments ought to be contextual. 
Bernard Williams for example famously questioned philosophers who like to play ‘Kant at the court 
of King Arthur’ (Williams 2005: 10). Similarly, Raymond Geuss comments that ‘political philosophy 
must recognise that politics is in the first instance about action and the contexts of action, not about 
mere beliefs or propositions’ (Geuss 2008: 11). Both means and consequences are extremely variable 
throughout time and space. Since their assessment is essential to choose between courses of action, it 
is a foolish endeavour trying to discuss the merit of end-states without reference to the particular 
context. Moreover, in order to appropriately evaluate means in a given state, it is paramount to 
consider where one is at the present moment.  
Deliberation among courses of action may resemble an instrumental calculus of the best means for 
whatever (pre-rationally) chosen end. Some political philosophers, like Thomas Hobbes and David 
Hume, did in fact share this instrumental view of rationality, now common among game-theorists. 
Indeed, classic political realists have been often seen as supporters of this instrumental version of 
rationality (Herzog 2008). Undeniably, deliberating about courses of action shares some similarities 
with Humean instrumental rationality. Both accounts are, in fact, subjectivist about value: they do not 
seek to establish the value of ends in any objective way, beside what the subject attributes to them. 
However, by taking into account means and consequences, this realistic outlook provides a more 
nuanced understanding of the relationship between preferences and reality. Indeed, deliberating about 
courses of action constraints the subjectivity of preferences, by revealing how goals themselves are 
not merely taken as fixed, but enter the calculation and are rebalanced against other elements in two 
ways. 
First, actors should rationally revise their ends is in light of other goals they might have. If one goal 
is necessarily incompatible with another goal, than I need to evaluate which one I care about the most. 
Suppose I like bachelor’s freedom, yet I am really in love with someone. I cannot consistently pursue 
both ends: I need to revise one or the other.  As Robert Nozick notes: 
‘one tiny step beyond Hume, not something he need resist, I think, are the constraints on 
how preferences hang together […] Contemporary decision theory takes this one step 
beyond Hume: although it does not say that any individual preference is irrational, it 
does say that a group of them together can be’ (Nozick 1994: 140) 
Second, realistic deliberation is slightly heavier than instrumental rationality, because it does not 
simply require decisions to be consistent with a set of goal, but also with the real world which weighs 
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on our choices by establishing means, consequences and likelihoods independently from what we 
want them to be. Again, the decision about what to do partly hinges on the constraints that reality 
casts on our preferences. 
In practice the relation between ends, means, consequences and likelihood of success can be seen as 
kind of ‘reflective equilibrium’ (Rawls 1971: 18). By focusing on courses of action rather than on 
ideal state we accept to rebalance how strongly we seek to pursue the intended goal in light of its 
means and consequences. We adjust the value of all parts of courses of action until they are in 
equilibrium. 
Mistakes in Deliberation 
Deliberation among courses of action allows to isolate unrealistic modes of social engagement. I shall 
briefly highlight seven ideal-types3 of political mistakes4: fanatic, saint, naïve, ineffective, wishful, 
self-deceptive and akratic agents: 
Neglect of part of the course of action 
Fanatic 
Fails to consider the costs of 
means and consequences 
Saint 
Fails to consider the benefit of 
end-states 
Naïve 
Fails to consider likelihood of 
success 
Mistakes in evaluating the course of action 
Wishful 
Knowledge of means and 
consequences, distorted by 
preferences  
Ineffective 
Fails to acquire available 
knowledge of means and 
consequences  
Self-deceptive 
Knowledge of his own 
preferences, distorted by other 
preferences 
Irrelevant courses of action 
Akratic 
Fails to act on his correct deliberation 
 
Let us now consider each failure in more details. 
Fanatic 
A fanatic is a political actor who does not deliberate on the full course of action, but focuses 
exclusively on the value of his favoured end-state. Consequently, the cost of means and consequences, 
                                                     
3 These flaws only approximate empirical cases, and are by no means mutually exclusive. For example, a saint might also be naïve, 
while a fanatic might be also wishful. 
4 While these kinds of failures are ubiquitous in human life, they are particularly grave in political arena (Galeotti 2018). I will 
however discuss cases from ordinary life for explanatory purposes. 
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however grave, escapes his evaluation and makes him willing to sacrifice anything to his goal. Any 
means become permissible and beyond scrutiny, in light of the final goal. The irrationality of the 
fanatic stems from his inability to reassess the value of his end in light of the costs of its means. Yet 
if the fanatic truly wishes to realize what he wants, he needs to factor means and consequences in his 
decisions as well. A fanatic is thus someone who is so committed to some idea that he is willing to 
disregard his other interests (Hare 1977).  
A typical example of fanatic is someone who supports a bloody revolution. Yet not any rebel is a 
fanatic, only those that do so without considering the means they employ. Someone who attentively 
ponders the course of action, but finds out that some distasteful means are indeed outweighed by the 
value of his end, would not count as a fanatic. The crucial element is to enter the political calculus of 
means, ends and consequences. Realists do not criticize the goals chosen by fanatic actors, nor the 
extreme means they employ. Rather, they condemn the fanatic’s refusal to reconsider his goal with 
respect to the means that such a goal requires and the consequences it carries. Fanatics are so absorbed 
by their goals that they do not enter the deliberation on courses of action at all. Even if they do enter 
the deliberation, they usually do so only formally to seek confirmations for their goals rather than 
with the critical attitude to revise their end-states in light of the means and consequences. 
A good historical example of fanaticism might be Robespierre, who during the French Revolution 
was so devoted to the ideals of the republic that he was willing to use the terror of the guillotine to 
secure it. Robespierre was a fanatic ‘striving to establish his authority over men's minds, and to 
accomplish this he was ready, if necessary, to pass over the dead bodies of his opponents’ (Kropotkin 
1927: 551). He did not consider the costs of terror, nor its consequences, but focused exclusively on 
the value of its end-state: the republic. Of course, historical accounts are necessarily imperfect, and 
other scholars doubt that he was a fanatic. In fact, under some accounts Robespierre is viewed as a 
skilled judge willing to discriminate between those who were counter-revolutionaries and those who 
had merely been misled (Rudé 1991). This example shows that it is not always easy to assess 
fanaticism from the outside, but the crucial point of the argument stand: if one wants to realize his 
preferences, one should avoid reasoning like a fanatic. 
Saints 
The type of political behaviour most criticised by political realists is acting saintly. The previous 
argument offers us a way to highlight what precisely is wrong with saints. A saint focuses exclusively 
on means, ignoring end-states which are only realizable employing ‘forbidden’ means. The problem 
is the same as with the fanatic: a fixation on single part of the course of action and the refusal to 
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balance it against other considerations. For this reason, this behaviour has been qualified ‘fanaticism 
of means’ (Pontara 1974). 
Consider Machiavelli’s remarks about Christian ethics (Berlin 1972). According to their moral 
doctrine, a good Christian would refuse to use violent means regardless of the goal. He would rather 
‘turn the other cheek’ to their offender. However, politics requires the occasional use of violence. 
Only a bad politician always avoids using violence. This does not mean that one can use violence 
lightly. On the contrary, an ‘economy of violence’ is encouraged in Machiavelli’s thought, because 
violence is costly. The point is to be prepared to do ‘evil’ when the situation requires it, i.e. when the 
end-state and consequences warrant it. True Christians would never consider the benefits of being 
evil, and would avoid doing so at all costs. Thus, Christians might make good men, but poor 
politicians. Weber gave a good description of this type of error: 
‘you must be a saint in all respects or at least want to be one; you must live like Jesus, 
the apostles, St. Francis, and their like, and then this ethic will make sense and be the 
expression of true dignity. But not otherwise. For if, following this unworldly ethic of 
love, you ought to "resist not him that is evil with violence" - the politician must abide by 
the opposite commandment: "You shall use force to resist evil, for otherwise you will be 
responsible for its running amok"’ (Weber 2004: 82) 
Note however that categorical refusal to employ violence can in some context be effective: Mantena 
for example argued that Gandhian non-violence was a realist strategy (Mantena 2012). In the context 
of a liberal democracy peaceful resistance may appeal to others and be a strong engine for political 
change. Conversely, using violence in a democratic regime usually delegitimizes one own position 
and may have the opposite effect. The context, again, is crucial. 
More generally, the critique of the saint is a critique of deontological political agents. A less dramatic 
example is the famous Kantian case of refusing to lie under any circumstances. Even when he is faced 
by a murderer inquiring the whereabouts of his children, one is committed to answer truthfully (Kant 
1999). A politician who always lies is usually terrible, but a politician who never lies won’t be very 
good either, as he would condemn himself to political impotency. 
If Christians and Kantians wanted to realize their preferences, however, they should be willing to 
rebalance their principles in light of the end-state, which would be realizable through forbidden 
means, and to check if these are worthy of infringing the categorical rule. It might still be the case 
that they end up deciding against it, if the benefits are not deemed good enough to outweigh the costs 
of violating the moral rule. Otherwise, they would give up the commitment to realize their 
preferences, as they can give up extremely positive consequences in exchange for a minimal violation 
of principle. Whenever certain means are excluded in principle without entering in the political 
Carlo Burelli 
11 
 
calculus of ends, means and consequences, we fails to execute social change, and remain confined to 
the status quo. 
As Machiavelli famously pointed out: ‘it is very suitable that when the deed accuses him, the effect 
excuses him’ (Machiavelli 2009: 29). Deliberation among courses of action makes sense of 
Machiavelli’s idea, which has become a tantamount of realism, that even repugnant means are 
permissible if the expected effect and consequences are far greater. However, Machiavelli adds that: 
‘when the effect is good, as was that of Romolus, it will always excuse the deed; for he who is violent 
to spoil, not he who is violent to mend should be reproved’ (Machiavelli 2009: 29). This means that 
it is not the case that any end justifies any means, as sometimes his claim is too easily popularized. A 
more accurate interpretation would be that some ends justify some means. In particular, the effect of 
conserving the state and the ‘salus populi’ allows violent means. The best available means, even 
morally repugnant ones, are permissible in choosing a course of action whose end-state and 
consequences are good enough to outweigh them. But this is not always the case.  
Naïve 
A naïve actor is someone who ignores the likelihood success. One option might be better than another, 
and yet significantly less likely to be realized. Thus, the value of the final state needs to be discounted 
by the probability of realizing it. Sometimes, taking a risk for a significant better end-state might be 
worth it, if the expected utility is greater. Other times, it is just more sensible to focus on more assured 
if less spectacular improvements.  
Consider for example the introduction of Obama-care in the USA. Of course, one might have ideally 
preferred a more advanced welfare system, like those that are actually working in Europe. Yet, even 
the more modest Obama-care was barely realizable in the American political climate, having to deal 
with a republican majority in the senate. Striving for the more ambitious proposal, would have 
probably meant failure, and thus being stuck with the terrible status quo ante. 
Deliberating about courses of action captures the worry about feasibility, sometimes (Valentini 2012) 
but not always (Sleat 2014) associated with a realistic perspective. End states that are completely 
unrealizable become inert preferences in evaluating courses of action because they are rebalanced 
against their zero-probability of being realized. For example, I might want to visit Alpha Centauri, 
but this state of affairs is unrealizable and cannot motivate me to do anything at all. The preference 
remains inert for as long as a new course of action emerges that might lead to my preference being 
satisfied. A particular goal is completely nullified if there are no means to reach it, as its probability 
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and expected value become 0. This does not mean that improbable goals are not worth striving for, 
but only that one has to rebalance their value against their likelihood of success. 
A difficult case to evaluate is when by acting seemingly irrationally, we make a certain course of 
action possible that otherwise wouldn't be. Suppose we want to organize a large protest in a situation 
of widespread political apathy. This may seem impossible, but if we are slightly naive about it and 
we refuse to take apathy into account, we might in the end succeed in mobilizing a large number of 
people. Realism does not mean pessimism, instead it requires us to take the very possibility of this 
mobilization into account. Weber famously stated that ‘what is possible could never have been 
achieved unless people had tried again and again to achieve the impossible in this world’ (Weber 
2004: 93). This example thus rightly cautions us against being excessively pessimistic, when we 
evaluate concrete paths to improve society. Sticking to an accurate assessment of feasibility is 
essential to pursue effective and realist social change. 
Ineffective 
An ineffective actor is an actor that makes an epistemically wrong assessment of means, 
consequences and likelihood of success. If one wants to realize his preference, however, one must be 
very attentive in evaluating the evidence. 
In a famous example of his, Bernard Williams considers the following situation: ‘the agent believes 
that this stuff is gin, when it is in fact petrol. He wants a gin and tonic. Has he reason, or a reason, to 
mix this stuff with tonic and drink it?’ (Williams 1981: 102). Williams’s idea is that due to an 
epistemically incorrect assessment of reality, the actor takes a course of action that does not align 
with his own goal, and suffers negative consequences for it.  
Let us consider a more political example. A foreign political actor wishes to turn a cruel dictatorship 
into a democracy and concludes that a military intervention is likely to succeed, and that no significant 
negative consequence is to be expected. In particular, he expects this war to be swift and painless, as 
the dictator’s army is weak and the target population would support the liberating army. However, 
these factual assumptions happen to be wrong as the military intervention creates a long and bloody 
civil war. 
Of course uncertainty is a common underlying assumption of all political decisions and one cannot 
be deemed irrational for not knowing something he could not reasonably have known. Yet taking a 
political decision without considering available information leads to failure in implementing any 
social change.  
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Wishful 
Wishful actors are agents who have an erroneous view of reality, because they allow their preferences 
to distort their knowledge of means, consequences and likelihood of success. Just as ineffective actors 
are mistaken about the world in which they leave, wishful actors consistently refuse to recognize it 
for what it is. It is thus a self-defeating mistake to allow our ideals to distort our beliefs about the 
world. If we do this, we misrepresent means and consequences, and thus make it more difficult to 
realize what we want.  
Elaborating on Aesop’s example of the fox and the grapes, we can imagine a wishful-thinking fox 
would simply refuse to acknowledge the fact that there are no ways for her to get the grapes (suppose 
this is true). She would never enjoy living in a world so cruel that allows tasty grapes to escape her 
reach. As a consequence, she is willing to falsely believe that there must be some way to reach the 
grapes. As she pointlessly obsesses over figuring out how to reach the grapes, she misses the food 
she could actually reach and ends up starving.  
A political example of this kind of irrationality is given by a variation on the classic theme  of ‘dirty 
hands’ (Walzer 1973), where a politician refuses to torture a terrorist in order to obtain information 
that would prevent an attack and save thousands of lives. In Walzer’s original example, the politician 
is a saint: he is refusing to use dreadful and immoral means that would violate his moral principles. 
Let us consider a variation, in which the politician is instead wishful: he does not believe that torture 
is always forbidden, it would be acceptable when the lives of thousands are at stake. He is instead 
convinced that ‘there must be a better way’ to prevent the attack, which does not compromise his 
moral purity. If by assumption one can reasonably know that there is no other way, then he is being 
wishful insofar as his beliefs are distorted by his desires. The best means available in this example 
are very costly and thus the politician is wishfully trying to convince himself that there are better 
ways to obtain the same results without paying so high a cost. Being wishful means rejecting accurate 
beliefs in favour of beliefs that would fit better with our desires and is a detriment to realizing our 
own preferences. 
Self-Deceptive 
A self-deceptive actor is someone who is mistaken about his own desires. They allow some of their 
preferences, to distort the knowledge of other preferences. 
I might believe I enjoy studying, while all I want is just to appear like one who enjoys studying. If 
this is true, than I am having false beliefs about my preferences. This is problematic because it leads 
one to perform the political calculus under false assumptions. This would lead to pick a course of 
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action, which is not in line with one’s preference, or maybe even fail to carry through with it. If I 
think I enjoy studying, I might choose to take a PhD. However, if this is a case of self-deception, I 
might end up failing to put up with studying and never graduate. 
This case is similar to the previous one. Like a wishful actor has false beliefs about the facts of the 
world, because he wants them to be different from what they are, so does the self-deceptive actor 
have false beliefs about his own preferences, because he wants them to be different from what they 
are. Of course, there is nothing necessarily wrong with having such second-order desires. The 
problem is when they distort our own beliefs about what we want. In this way, they alter the political 
calculus and lead us to courses of actions, which do not help us to realize our desires. 
In Sartre’s vivid description of the problem of dirty hands, it seems that Hugo is a wishful actor rather 
than a saint: ‘Purity is a concept of fakirs and friars. But you, the intellectuals, the bourgeois 
anarchists, you invoke purity as your rationalization for doing nothing’ (Sartre 1965).  
Akratic 
The final political failure is akrasy, the condition under which one reasons correctly about what he 
should do, but then is unable to bring himself to do it. This case is the explicit denial of the meta-
preference I have argued for in the beginning: it is a failure to be moved to realize one’s own 
preferences. In Hume’s view of instrumental irrationality, there is nothing necessarily wrong with 
akrasy. He explicitly says that: ‘Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledg'd 
lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than for the latter’ (Hume 
2007: 128).  
This is a much-debated issue in philosophy, which can only briefly be considered here, but 
deliberating about courses of action may help disentangling this puzzling perspective. It is entirely 
plausible that one looks positively on some end-state, and yet refuses to undertake the course of action 
that leads to it. It might be the case that the costs of means and consequences for the agent outweigh 
the value of the end-states. In such case, the preferred end-state can only be realized through terrible 
courses of action. Suppose I really want to be fit, and I rank it highly among my preferences. Yet, I 
am also quite lazy and I do not want to hit the gym three times a week. In this case, I may appear 
akratic about the isolated end-state, but I am quite rational about the whole course of action. 
Akrasy may however still persist with regards to the whole course of action. What if I evaluate the 
whole course of action positively (e.g. being fit and hit the gym), but I still fail to act? In this case it 
is clearly in contrast with the preference to realize one’s own preferences, and should be avoided. 
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Ovid gave a vivid representation of akrasia, describing Medea: the mythical mother who killed her 
own children for vengeance against her husband. He writes ‘video meliora proboque, deteriora 
sequor’ (Ovid 1972: 59): I see and approve of the better, but I follow the worst. Medea may fail to 
entertain the deliberation on the course of action, because she did not entertain the cost of the means 
of her revenge, or she is rational but insincere. In this second case, she would have entertained the 
political calculation only to find out that her revenge was more valuable to her than the lives of her 
children. This is indeed how Hobbes interpreted Ovid’s sentence: ‘that saying, as pretty as it is, is not 
true; for though Medea sees many reasons to forebear killing her children, yet the last dictate of her 
judgment was, that the present revenge on her husband outweighed them all, and thereupon the 
wicked action necessarily followed’ (Hobbes and Bramhall 1999).  
With respect of social change, true akrasy is possibly the gravest sin. One should particularly be wary 
of philosophical akrasy, where we are so much focused on thinking about the best way to arrange 
society, that we become uninterested in actually changing it for the better. 
Conclusion 
Political philosophy should not be concerned only about what to think, but also about what to do. The 
reason for this is that desiring something gives us reasons to seek to realize it. Seeking to realize it 
forces us to confront reality, and imposes all sorts of constraints on us.  
Particularly when we seek to change society, I argue, we do best if we heed these constraints. When 
we act, we ought to be sensitive about means, consequences and likelihoods of success. 
This soberly realistic perspective should not lead us to adopt a conservatory stance. Quite the 
opposite. Unless we deliberate among courses of actions, we face a strong risk of failure. And in 
action, the cost of failure is the preservation of the status quo. 
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